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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
vs.

VAL TAYLOR,

Case No.
1105~

Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Val Taylor, appeals from a conviction of the crime of contributing to or becoming
responsible for the neglect or delinquency of a
child, in violation of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~
55-10-800) (Supp. 1967).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried without a jury in the
Second District Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for the crime charged in the complaint.
The Honorable John Farr Larson found appellant
guilty and imposed sentence on the appellant of
confinement in the county jail for a term of six
months.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of
the Second District Juvenile Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following statement of facts as being more in keeping with the rule that evidence will be reviewed on
appeal in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination.
On or about February 9, 1967, appellant led his
two stepdaughters, Shana and Christine Sleater,
into the bathroom of the family home, removed
their clothing, and proceeded to wash their pubic
areas with a washcloth (T. 8, 23). Appellant then took
the children into the master bedroom (T. 14) and
told the children to get on the bed (T. 23). Appellant
was nude at this time (T. 24). Appellant then had
both children commit an act of fellatio (T. 8, 24) referred to in the record as "oral sodomy." There is
also direct evidence of appellant committing cur.nilingus on the children (T. 8, 24).
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE JUVENILE COURT WAS CORRECT IN
NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
SINCE THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE OF THE OFFENSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVED AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

~

.j

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
not granting his motion to dismiss on the failure of
the state to prove the exact time of the offense in
question. Respondent submits that Utah statutes do
not require the exact time to be shown unless required to charge the offense and that the case law
requires only that the offense occurred within the
statute of limitations and before indictment.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-21-12 (1953) provides: (1) an
information or indictment need contain no allegation of the time of the commission of the offense
unless such allegation is necessary to charge the offense under Section 77-21-8. (2) The allegation in an
information or an indictment that the defendant
committed the offense shall in all cases be considered an allegation that the offense was committed
after it became an offense and before the filing of
the information or indictment, and within the period
of limitations prescribed by law for the prosecution
of the offense. (3) All allegations of the information,
indictment and all bills of particular shall, unless
stated otherwise, be deemed to refer to the same
time.
The Complaint herein states that the offense
occurred "on or about the 9th day of February
1967." The general rule is that the State is not bound
by the allegation of "on or about" in an indictment
as to the date of the commission of an offense, but
may rely on anv date within the period of limitations. Ellis v. State, 318 S.W.2d 655 (Texas 1958). In
crimes involving sexual offenses, time is not a neces-
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sary element, and the State may elect to prove any
such offenses which occurred prior to the filing of
complaint and against which the statutes of limitation has not run. State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134
P.2d 173 (1943). citing State v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426,
146 Pac. 306 (1915).
The allegation of time of the commission of an
offense is immaterial and regardless of the time alleged, except where made certain by a bill of particulars, the State may prove the offense at any time
within the period of limitations. State v. Cox, 106
Utah 253, 147 P.2d 858 (1944).
The fact that these proceedings occurred in
juvenile court do not affect the outcome of the case.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 55-10-81 (1963) provides:
In proceedings in adult cases the practice and procedure of the juvenile court shall conform to the
practice and procedure provided by law or rule of
court for criminal proceedings in the district court
except that the proceedings may be commenced
by complaint and a jury shall consist of four jurors.

The statute of limitations applicable to the offense
here charged permits the prosecution and conviction of a person for such an offense when committed
within a perbd of two years anterior to the presentment of the information and complaint. Utah Code
Ann. ~ 77-9-6 (1953).
There was sufficient evidence before the trial
court t8 show that the offense in question occurred
within a six week period prior to February 12, 1967.

I
I

I

The respondent would, therefore, submit that the
Juvenile Court was correct in not granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to
prove the commission on the exact date.
POINT II. EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed error in allowing Shana and Christine Sleater
to testify. At the time of the testimony Shana was
seven years old and Christine was six years old.
Prior to their testimony the deputy county attorney
interrogated both witnesses in the presence of the
court and the appellant's counsel. They indicated
where they lived, acknowledged they were attending school, and gave the names of their brothers
and sisters. They further indicated they knew what
it was to tell the truth and knew what happened if
thev told a lie. They acknowledged that they knew
it was bad not to tell the truth and that they intended
to tell the truth. They undersood that if they testified falsely they would be punished. No objection
was made at any time to the testimony of either
Shana or Christine Sleater.
The appellant's position ]s that the trial court
did not examine the children to ascertain whether
they were capable of receiving correct impressions
and therefore able to relay facts accurately. It is
submitted that the appellant's position is without
merit.
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The appellant is m no position to challenge the
court's action since no objection was raised at the
time of trial. It is the general rule that a person challenging the competency of a witness must object
prior to the time the witness is sworn or at least as
soon as the incompetency of the witness is discovered. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice. 4th ed., § 268.
If the appellant felt the trial court had acted improperly in allowing the girls to testify, it was incumbent
to raise the objection at the time of trial. The failure
to impose any objection indicates a waiver on the
part of the appellant and further tends to support
the conclusion that those who saw the witnesses
and heard the responses to the questions put to
them felt that there was no question as to the children's competency.
It is well settled in Utah law the questions of
competency of an infant witness is one within the
sound discretion of the trial court and this court will
not overrule the trial court's decision in the absence
of a clear showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. State v. Blythe. 20 l Ttah 378, 58 Pac. 1108
(1899); State v. Morasco. 42 Utah 5, 128 Pac. 571 (1912);
State v. McMillan. 46 Utah 19, 145 Pac. 833 (1915);
State v. Zeezich. 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927 (1922); State
v. Williams. 111 Utah 379. 180 P.2d 551 (1947).
The testimony of a six-year old child is not rendered completely incompetent nor entirely discredited solely because of her age. As this court has
previously observed, no particular age nor any specific stanclard of mental ability can be set as the
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qualification for g1vmg testimony, but it is an importa_nt factor to be considered, along with others,
in determinating whether she should be allowed to
testify. What is essential is that it appears that the
child has sufficient intelligence and maturity that
she is able to understand the questions put to her;
that she has some knowledge of the subject under
inquiry and the facts involved therein; that she is
able to remember what happened; and that she has
a sense of moral duty to tell the truth. Whether she
meets these tests and is therefore a competent witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court
to determine. That ruling will not be disturbed in
the absence of a clear showing of abuse. State v.
Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965).
The Utah State Supreme Court will presume
neither error nor prejudice and the burden
of so show in g is on the defendant who
seeks to upset the judgment of conviction.
State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966).
The reviewing court is required to analyze evidence
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
in light most favorable to judgment. State v. Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). The competency of a six and one-half year old prosecuting
witness to testify in a prosecution for committing
lascivious acts upon a child was a question for the
determination of the trial court in the exercise of a
sound discretion. The trial court's determination
would not be disturbed in the absence of a showing
of an abuse of such discretion. People v. O'Connor,
44 C.A.2d 301, 112 P.2d 279 (1941).
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POINT III. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT
TO RECALL PROSECUTION WITNESSES FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION.

Appellant contends inconsistency in the testimony of the grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Hedberg;
the children's mother, Carolyn Taylor; and the testimony of the children themselves. As appellant has
stated, it is left to the discretion of the trial court to
allow the recalling of witnesses for further exam·
ination. As this court has pointed out on numerous
occasions, the extent to which redirect examination
may be permitted rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court and unless abuse of discretion
can be shown in admitting or excluding testimony,
the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed on
appeal. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764
(1949).
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Baca,
102 Ariz. 83, 425 P.2d 108 (1967) held that the trial
court has large discretionary power in the control
of cross-examination and, in order to find error, the
reviewing court must find that the trial court has
abused that discretion.
The respondent therefore urges that there is
not such an· inconsistency in the testimony of the
prosecuting witnesses or their mother to require
further grueling cross-examination of the two children. The children testified as to the acts and as to
the time of these acts. Since the appellant did not take
the stand, pursuant to his constitutional right to do

